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er a number of weeks during the winter and early spring of 2001, the pages of 
man newspapers were filled with a debate about the militant past of current 
erman vice-chancellor and foreign secretary Joschka Fischer. The discussion started 
hen both Spiegel and Stern magazines published extensive interviews with Fischer 
d stories about his involvement with the radical left-wing political scene in 
ankfurt am Main during the early 1970s. Stern magazine headlined the Fischer 
terview “Yes, I was a militant” (4 January 2001) while Der Spiegel entitled its own 
ad-story “Joschka’s wild year” (8 January 2001). Both publications made ample use 
 allegedly newly discovered photographs showing a motorcycle-helmet-wearing 
er beating a policeman during the “Kettenhof riots” against housing speculators 
Frankfurt’s Westend in April 1973.1  
e immediate cause for the German media’s in
trial of Hans-Joachim Klein, one of his ac
s involvement in the December 1975 attack on the Vienna OPEC headquarters. 
aving turned his back on terrorism as early as 1976, Klein had lived inconspicuously 
 France under a false identity to be arrested only in 1998. In October 1999, almost a 
arter-century after the OPEC raid, he was put on trial and eventually given the 
nt sentence of nine years in prison for his part in the kidnapping and the murder 
the three people who had died during the attack.  
n 16 January 2001 Fischer appeared as a character witness for Klein in the trial. 
hile he was unable to shed any further light on Klein’s part
id, as he had lost sight of him significantly earlier than that, 
scription of the political sub-culture of Frankfurt and the role he had played in it. 
e eloquently described how, by illegally occupying large unused flats in Frankfurt’s 
estend and living collectively, the young members of the local unorganized Left 
tempted to create a counter-milieu to the prevailing bourgeois consensus in the city. 
is-)Quoting one of Adorno’s aphorisms, Fischer pointed out that rather than 
                                              
hile the identification of Fischer on the images of photographer Lutz Kleinhans was new, the 
tures themselves had been published as early as 1973 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
hough not owning the copyright, Bettina Röhl, Ulrike Meinhof’s daughter, had sold them for an 
 figure to the press and posted them on her website (www.bettinaroehl.de), until a court-
1 W
pic
Alt
undisclosed
injunction forced her to withdraw them from public view. 
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3 
ing for the revolution to occur at some distant point in the future, he and his 
ends wanted “to lead the right life in the wrong society (das richtige Leben im 
lschen führen)”. As far as his own use of violent direct action against the forces of 
curity during evictions and demonstrations was concerned, Fischer was largely 
apologetic. He argued that on those rare occasions he acted in self-defence. At the 
me time, he pointed out that he never condoned the gratuitous violence that the 
rmed struggle” against the political system as a whole involved.2 
 the newspaper debate surrounding Fischer’s court appearance two camps em
e minority position, whose representatives not surprisingly also included members 
e CDU/CSU opposition in the Bundestag, argued that although he had apologized 
 the policeman, he had not distanced himself sufficiently from his past militancy and 
us was unfit to serve in government. The majority however claimed that Fischer’s 
nversion from street-fighting man to vice-chancellor gave evidence for the unifying 
ength and integrationist force of the (West) German state. 
hile the discussion was of little consequence and ended as quickly as it began, 
hind it lurk larger issues. The urgency with which questions concerni
cretary’s – by no means secret – past were asked points to something else. The 
ischer debate” betrays a fundamental insecurity about how the metamorphosis of a 
of a political generation from militancy to acceptance of the political 
tus quo came about. The discussion about the foreign secretary’s militant youth, a 
emingly never-ending flow of terrorist memoirs, as well as international “Prada 
einhof chic”, that is, a superficial fascination with 1970s left-wing militancy in 
ntemporary pop culture and fashion,3 are symptomatic of a lack of knowledge and 
derstanding about the significance of “1968” and the “red decade” (from 1967 to 
77) in relation to recent German history. Marathon runner Fischer might have 
plained his transformation from young militant to member of the political 
ablishment in his fittingly entitled autobiography My Long Run to Myself.4 
                                              
osef Hrycyk, Im Wortlaut: Joschka Fischer im Opec-Prozeß 
w.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,117823,00.html (15.1.2002), pp. 4 and 12-14.  
p. Matt Worley, “Come the revolution, we’ll all be in combats.” The Guardian, 19.11.1999. 
2 J
ww
3 C
4 Cp. Joschka Fischer, Mein langer Lauf zu mir selbst (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2000). 
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wever, the socio-cultural transformation that the Federal Republic underwent in the 
s and 1970s and the part that the protest movements and their terrorist offspring 
ayed in it are still far from clear.  
rd Koenen has pointed to two contradictio
search on West Germany from the late 1960s to the 1970s:5 firstly, the paradox that 
e conflict between the militant Left and the state played itself out during the years 
hen SPD-led governments embarked on a long-overdue reform of society. As a 
sult West Germany in many respects became indeed a more liberal and modern 
ciety. Yet the same governments stifled the reform spirit with the anti-liberal 
f their “policy of inner security” (Politik der inneren Sicherheit). Secondly, 
e paradox that the liberalisation and modernisation of the Federal Republic 
pposedly owed much to the input of Fischer’s generation, the “1968ers”, whose 
tlook was anti-liberal, anti-parliamentary and anti-western and – quite importantly 
whose relationship to the use of violence against the state and the forces of order, as 
scher’s example demonstrates, was ambivalent at best.  
hile this article will not be able to completely resolve these contradictions, it 
tempts to both shed further light on them and provide insights on h
60s and 1970s might be explained from a perspective that interprets them as 
mptoms of a conflict between political generations. The discussion of generation 
nflict will be interwoven with a counter-narrative of intergenerational 
derstanding, which proves rather untypical of these conflict-ridden years. The 
story of the personal relationship between Gaby Tiedemann and Heinrich Albertz. 
ll demonstrate that if a politician was willing to assume the role of a surrogate 
ther and, in so doing, relinquish his responsibilities towards the political system to 
e benefit of what Max Weber called “absolute ethics” (Gesinnungsethik), was there 
 alternative to the escalation of violence, which was characteristic for the stand-off 
between West Germany’s militant left-wing youth and the élites of its state and 
so
   
ciety.  
                                              
p. Gerd Koenen, “Die Putztruppe – Ein ABC der Gewalt.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
.2001 and Matthias Arning, “Lücken im Familienroman. Gerd Koenen über ‘das rote Jahrzehnt’ 
67-1977.” Fr
5 C
13.1
19 ankfurter Rundschau, 27.1.2001.  
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e Lorenz kidnapping 
 exchange for Peter Lorenz, the chairman and mayoral candidate of the West Berlin 
ristian Democrats for the Senate elections of 2 March 1975, who had been 
ducted by the left-wing terrorist group MOVEMENT 2ND OF JUNE (Bewegung 2. 
ni) five days earlier. After her release Tiedemann and four other freed militants, 
erena Becker, Rolf Heißler, Rolf Pohle and Ingrid Siepmann, met with Heinrich 
lbertz, formerly the SPD mayor of Berlin and now the protestant pastor of one of the 
ty’s parishes, on a runway of Frankfurt airport. The Lorenz kidnappers had 
pressed their demands in a letter to the West German press agency (Deutsche 
esseagentur, dpa) that was to be published in the major newspapers. Most 
portantly, they wanted six of their jailed “comrades” to be released from various 
isons in West Germany and West Berlin. These included the then left-wing lawyer 
orst Mahler, who was serving a fourteen-year sentence in Berlin-Tegel for formation 
 a terrorist organisation, attempted murder and his part in the liberation of Andreas 
ader in May 1970. Mahler however quickly declined to be released.6 The 
maining five had to be flown to an Arab country of their choice and receive a 
m of DM 20,000 each. On their journey they were “to be accompanied to their 
stination by a figure in public life”. The letter specified that “this person [was] to be 
e parson and retired mayor Heinrich Albertz”.7  
er the five had reached their destination safely, Albertz was supposed to return 
me in possession of a codeword, which, once made public over German state 
levision, would lead to the immediate re
mself available, the Social-Liberal coalition government under Helmut Schmidt 
ved in to the kidnappers’ demands. This was not only done in agreement with the 
ter-party large crisis team (großer Krisenstab), which included the leaders of the 
                                              
eleased from prison in 1978, Mahler has attracted public attention again as intellectual figurehead 
r the German far right and legal representative of the NPD in its since March 2003 ultimately 
ccessful battle against the current government’s attempt to have it banned by the German 
6 R
fo
su
constitutional court.  
7 Die Entführung von Peter Lorenz. Eine Dokumentation der Berliner Morgenpost über die Zeit vom 
27. Februar bis 5. März 1975 (Berlin: Springer, 1975), p. 23. 
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6 
sition Helmut Kohl and Franz-Josef Strauß, but also with the overwhelming 
pport of the press and the majority of the population. In a poll on West Berlin 
ection weekend by the Allensbach Institut, 56 percent of those asked were in favour 
 a deal with the kidnappers, 36 percent against.8 In what became the first successful 
duction of a public figure in West Germany and remained the only incident in 
hich the West German state allowed itself to be blackmailed by the militant Left, 
ter Lorenz, shaken but unharmed, was released soon after.  
at Heinrich Albertz should accompany the freed terrorists was fraught 
litical symbolism. Albertz was mayor of West Berlin on the day in 1967 that gave 
VEMENT 2ND OF JUNE its name. On the evening of 2 June 1967, Benno 
hnesorg, a twenty-six-year-old university student, was shot dead by a West Berlin 
lice officer during a de onstration against the Shah of Persia’s visit to Germany. 
perienced and perceived by Ohnesorg’s age cohort as a particularly powerful 
litical event, his death was crucial for the formation of the “generation of 1968” as 
political generation”. Furthermore, this first of three “critical events” for the 
968ers” over the following year also marked the beginning of the end of the non-
olent phase in the confrontation between the New Left protest movements and the 
governing Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU/CSU.9 That was 
arily because the police behaviour raised the question whether the use of counter-
olence was legitimate. Most of the protesters saw the exaggerated security measures 
ring the Shah’s visit as proof for their suspicion that behind the democratic façade 
 the Federal Republic a proto-fascist state not unlike Persia itself was lurking. 
e second critical event came ten months later, again in Berlin. On 11 April 1968 
di Dutschke, leading theoretician of the Socialist German Student League 
ozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, SDS) and figurehead of the anti-
thoritarian student movement, was shot on the Kurfürstendamm and seriously 
red by a neo-Nazi youth. Rather than blaming the assassination attempt on the 
 
bid. p. 59. 
n the term “critical event” and for a summary of New Left thought see Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey, “May 
68 in France: The Rise and Fall of a Social Movement.” In Carol Fink/Philipp Gassert/Detlef Junker 
1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 253-76, 257 
8 I
9 O
19
eds., 
and 260-2. 
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7 
an alone, the protest movement laid the main responsibility for it at the 
s of the conservative newspaper tycoon Axel Springer. For them Bild, the 
pulist flagship of Springer’s press empire, which had portrayed Dutschke as “the 
carnation of disorderliness and revolutionary evil”, had inspired Josef Bachmann, a 
ifter and petty criminal, in his attempt on Dutschke’s life.10 Although Dutschke 
rvived on the occasion, in 1979 he died prematurely at age thirty-nine from the 
ng-term effects of the injuries inflicted upon him. 
ver the following Easter days of 1968, demonstrations and b
inting houses and distribution centres all over West Germany mobilized more than 
,000 protesters as well as 21,000 policemen. In what over five days and nights 
came the worst episodes of civil unrest in West Germany since the early 1930s, 
ore than 1,000 protesters were arrested, 400 people were injured, quite a few of 
em seriously.11 In Munich there were two deaths during the Easter riots. During the 
ght 11 to 12 April an Associated Press photographer and a student at the city’s 
chnical University lost their lives following injuries sustained during 
monstrations. 
e third critical event, which, however, already heralded the end of the protest 
ovements, occurred
ergency Laws. These were a series of constitutional amendments intended to grant 
e government sufficient executive powers in cases of national emergencies, 
cluding severe internal unrest.12 As this legislation was reminiscent of Article 48 of 
e Weimar constitution, it met with opposition from much of the left of the political 
ectrum, including the left wing of the SPD, the metal and chemical workers unions, 
d, last but not least, the student movement, which switched its attention from the 
                                              
Rob Burns/Wilfried van der Will, Protest and Democracy in West Germany. Extra-Parliamentary 
position and the Democratic Agenda (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 109-11. 
10 
Op
11 Figures according to Wolfgang Kraushaar, Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung. Von der 
Flaschenpost zum Molotowcocktail 1946-1995, vol. I Chronik (Hamburg: Rogner & Bernhard, 1998), 
pp. 304-5. 
12 Andrei S. Markovits/Philip S. Gorski, The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1993), p. 54. 
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test against the Vietnam War to this issue. On 11 May, the Extra-parliamentary 
sition (Außerparlamentarische Opposition, APO) succeeded in mobilising 
ound 60,000 demonstrators who converged on Bonn in a march from all over West 
ermany.13 Although the ability to get tens of thousands of students and workers onto 
e streets on this occasion was a significant success, the alignment of West German 
ew Left and Old Left, which seemed to fulfil long-harboured hopes of a lasting 
liance capable of achieving the New Left’s ultimate aim of a wholesale revolution, 
oved even more short-lived than its French equivalent.14 While increasing numbers 
 students became sensitive “to the fact that democracy could never be taken for 
and that a politically alert electorate was required to make its voice felt”15, if 
ry with unconventional means, in the aftermath the organized working class 
turned to conventional politics. Thus it became clear that the transition from protest 
 complete overthrow of the political order proved to be far beyond the capacity of 
e protest movements.  
is insight then marked the beginning of the “long march through the institutions”, a 
uch slower and more laborio
th APO and SDS dissolved in 1969-70, the idealistic impetus of their members was 
 no means spent by then. The majority of leftist university graduates joined the SPD 
ger to make sure that after the 1969 changeover of government the Social-Liberal 
alition under chancellor Willy Brandt would hold true its promises to accelerate the 
erdue reforms of state and society, which had slowly begun under the Grand 
alition. Others, like Fischer, turned to grassroots political activity in one of the K-
oups (K-Gruppen), a myriad of Leninist or Maoist avant-garde workers’ parties, 
unded in universities, schools, enterprises or parts of towns and cities in West 
                                              
13 Kraushaar, Frankfurter Schule und Studentenbewegung, vol. I Chronik, pp. 320-1. 
14 Markovits/Gorski, p. 57.  
15 Burns/van der Will, p. 112. 
16 Ibid. 115. Cp. Dutschke’s statements in this respect in the famous December 1967 television 
interview with Günter Gaus. In Günter Gaus, Was bleibt, sind Fragen. Die klassischen Interviews, ed. 
Hans-Dieter Schütt (Berlin: Das Neue Berlin, 2000), pp. 432-51.  
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9 
rmany, in order to prepare the “proletariat” for the overthrow of capitalism.  
hers yet again responded with a retreat from politics. They “dropped out” 
ussteigen) from society in order to construct an “alternative” life. As Fischer’s 
tempts to “lead the right life in the wrong society” demonstrate, the boundaries 
tween these groups were permeable. This was also true in relation to the small 
ntingent, which joined the RED CELLS (Rote Zellen), 2ND OF JUNE and the RED 
RMY FACTION (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF). However, while for the majority of 
e post-APO Left state-power needed to be confronted with passive resistance by 
ploying non-violent direct action techniques like demonstrations, peaceful 
ades and occupations of buildings with physical damage to property as the limit 
their militancy, this minority eventually went a step further. Those who founded or 
ose the latter groups set out on a path where causing personal injury and even 
urder seemed to be ultimately legitimate in the “armed struggle against the 
stem”.18  
ankfurt – Aden 
n 3 March 97
ent altogether ten hours
ies believe that the destination of the flight from Frankfurt was Tripoli or 
s Ababa, the plane was eventually redirected towards Aden in the People’s 
public of Yemen. Following protracted negotiations between Albertz and the 
emeni authorities, it was allowed to land and its passengers were issued visitors’ 
rmits.  
espite the unusual circumstances, the atmosphere on board was friendly. This was 
rtainly mainly due to a mutual understanding that the parties depended upon one 
other – Bec
rsonal freedom for good, Albertz to have Lorenz released and keep himself and the 
ht crews out of harm’s way. While, as the pastor put it in retrospect, he was not 
raid of being taken hostage himself – after all the flight had not been hijacked – he 
                                              
Gerd Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnt. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967-1977 (Cologne: 
epenheuer & Witsch, 2001), pp. 325-33. 
Markovits/Gorski, pp. 57-8. 
17 
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18 
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10 
rried about being able to physically cope with this difficult situation. The group 
wever treated him courteously, even with “moving signs of care” when they 
minded Albertz, who was suffering from poor circulation, to take his medication on 
e. He in turn reciprocated the friendliness by giving one of his shirts to Pohle, who, 
earing a woollen sweater, was suffering from the heat in the Middle East. Although, 
 Albertz remembered with dark humour, neither he nor the terrorists experienced “a 
st class feeling”, he succeeded in breaking down tensions and gaining the group’s 
st.19  
ore than with
th Gaby Tiedemann. Like Horst Mahler, Tiedemann, a former university student of 
ciology and politics, initially declined to be released from prison. However, 
entually she changed her mind. At the time, she was serving an eight-year jail 
ntence on two charges of attempted murder after a shoot-out with police in 1973. 
e had been caught in the act of stealing car registration plates needed for the bank 
bberies, which terrorist groups carried out in order to finance life in the 
derground and to contribute in “the expropriation of wealth and the means of 
oduction that belong to the government, the monopoly capitalists, the land owners 
imperialists”.20 Through his friendly and relaxed attitude and his ability to 
, Albertz gained Tiedemann’s confidence.21 
s mayor of West Berlin, Albertz was politically responsible for the events of 2 June 
. While initially he defended the extremely comprehe
ring the Shah’s visit as necessary and excused the harsh 
e shot that killed Ohnesorg, he soon changed his mind and came over to the side of 
e protesters. Although Albertz used a pretext for his resignation in September 1967, 
 reality he left office because that day represented a personal Damascus for him.22 In 
                                              
Heinrich Albertz, “‘Kein First-Class-Gefühl’. Heinrich Albertz über den Geisel-Flug nach Aden.” 
r Spiegel, 10 March 1975 and idem, Wir dürfen nicht schweigen. Ein politisches Gespräch mit 
olfgang Herles (Munich: Kindler, 1993), pp. 80-2. 
19 
De
W
20 Quoted in Markovits/Gorski, p. 67. 
21 Jacques Schuster, Heinrich Albertz – der Mann, der mehrere Leben lebte. Eine Biographie (Berlin: 
Alexander Fest Verlag, 1997), pp. 295-6. 
22 
Ja
Heinrich Albertz, “Erinnerungen an den 2. Juni.” In Eckhard Siepmann ed., Heiß und Kalt. Die 
hre 1945-69. Das BilderLeseBuch (Berlin: Espresso Verlag, 1986), pp. 570-2. 
  
 
his f
later,
Ju
oc
co
on
de
From h
pr
between pol
Ea
th
m
an
[o
no
It 
su , often against the official line of the 
SPD. In the late 1970s, he joined the peace movement, speaking out against the 
N
pa
al
fo
co
in
of
   
11 
arewell speech as a parliamentarian of Berlin’s Abgeordnetenhaus three years 
 he pointed out: “I was weakest when I was hardest, that is during that night of 2 
ne, because I did objectively the wrong thing.” Asked where he had failed on the 
casion in a 1992 newspaper interview, Albertz had the following to say:  
I mean the harsh reaction in general. Not so much the police, that’s hard to 
ntrol anyway, so one has to be careful in passing judgement. Much more that 
e believed – and that was the mistake – that one could in any way stop or even 
stroy this movement […] by repression or by confrontation.23 
is resignation as mayor until his death Albertz would use his position as 
otestant churchman and prominent author and publicist to become a “mediator 
itics and counter-culture” (Der Spiegel, 31 August 1981). Even before the 
ster riots of 1968, he called for an end of confrontation and a “new beginning” in 
e relationship between state and protest movements. This did not make him too 
any friends among professional politicians and West German society. Thus when, in 
 interview after his return from Aden, Albertz reminded the German public “that all 
f the five terrorists] could be [their] sons and daughters”, this was met with little or 
 understanding from most quarters.24  
will not come as a surprise, then, that in the next decades Albertz continued to 
pport minority positions and unpopular causes
ATO decision to deploy new nuclear weapons on West German soil and even 
rticipating in the peaceful blockade of a US atomic depot in September 1983. He 
so belonged to the staunchest critics of the way German reunification was achieved, 
r him “a brutal invasion of the West Germans”. And he rejected the “asylum 
mpromise” of 1992 in which the Kohl government restricted the flow of refugees 
to Germany by changing one of the basic rights of the constitution with the support 
 the SPD opposition.25  
                                              
Willi Lindemann, “Repression – ein falscher Weg. Heinrich Albertz erinnert sich an den 2. Juni 
67.” Berliner Zeitung, 30.5.1992. 
23 
19
24 “Verlorene Söhne und Töchter. Claus Christian Malzahn im Gespräch mit Pfarrer Heinrich Albertz, 
dem Grandseigneur des Dialogs.” Die Tageszeitung, 22.5.1992. 
25 Cp. “Heinrich Albertz.” In Munzinger Archiv. Internationales Biographisches Archiv 32/93. 
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om the late 1980s onwards, Albertz also became one of the most vocal supporters 
icial pardon for terrorists who had already served long sentences and 
stanced themselves from their militant past. In this context Albertz and Tiedemann 
ould get in contact with each other again more than a decade after their first 
counter. 
eneration confli
 March 1978, the sociolo
tumn” of the previous year from the distance of Amsterdam.26 His hypothesis was 
at the tensions that characterized public life in the Federal Republic from 1967 
wards were the expression of a crisis of the German “social habitus”– Elias’ 
eferred term for what is commonly called national identity – which manifested itself 
 a “conflict between [political] generations”.27 In drawing a direct comparison with 
e crisis of national identity that Germany had experienced after the First World War 
cause of the failure of its élites to acknowledge total defeat, Elias argued that the 
ash between political generations had its main root in missed opportunities after 
45. To quote Elias directly: 
The far-reaching disorientation, the growing helplessness about the direction, 
worth and meaning of the Federal Rep
consequence of the attempt to hu
ated a new situation.28  
r Elias, what was happening in West Germany in the preceding decade was 
ble after both the breakdown of civilisation from 1933 to 1945 and the 
“comm übbe), respectively the “selective accounts” unicative silence” (Hermann L
(R
po
w
   
obert G. Moeller), about it in the post-war era. The escalation of tensions to the 
int of an “enormous bitterness and enmity” between militant Left, state and society 
as primarily due to the unwillingness of West Germany’s leading strata to begin a 
                                              
Norbert Elias, “Gedanken über die Bundesrepublik.” Merkur. Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken 39 
85), pp. 735-55. 
Elias, The Germans. Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and 
26 
(19
27 
Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996; original German version Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1992), pp. 19, 408 and 413. Cp. also Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell’s preface, ibid. p. ix. 
28 Ibid. p. 418. 
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The real story behind the ideological façade of New Left versions of Marxism-
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gue about the country’s past. Instead of beginning a public discussion about the 
iod, the pre-war generation of Albertz (born 1915), Willy Brandt (1913) and 
hmidt (1918), as well as the “1945ers”, that is, the “sceptical generation” (Helmut 
helsky) of Flakhelfers and young front-soldiers, largely chose to remain silent. 
agmatism ruled their attitude to the functional élites of Nazism, which were almost 
mpletely reinstalled under Adenauer’s chancellorship.29 If because of the power-
lations not much could be done in terms of correcting stalled de-nazification efforts, 
e had to wait for a “natural solution” and meanwhile concentrate on rebuilding the 
untry and hope for the future.  
espite significant changes in the “polit
ten claimed, as a result of “1968”, the damage was already done. Now the
d to pay a high price. Furthermore, in Elias’ opinion, after the war West Germany’s 
ites had displayed a general lack of “patience, moderation, tolerance and conscious 
ring about the chances for fulfilment of those who are growing up”, while in the 
esent they resorted to “excessive media campaigns, oppressive laws and above all 
e of the law as a means of party-political power”.30  
l of this allowed West Germany’s war and post-war children to cloak themselves in 
e various guises of Marxist theory as a kind of camouflage for
ninism, Maoism etc. read like this for Elias: “We have taken on the guilt of our 
rents and grandparents that they did not want to or could not face because it was 
bearable. We derive our pride from the knowledge of being the better Germans 
cause we are ashamed of being German.”31  
t the same time, New Left theory served the younger generations as a means of 
ientation in their search for meaning during the prosperity that the “economic 
                                              
29 
In
Be
Re
30 Elias, The Germans, pp. 412-3. 
31 Cp. ibid. p. 406. 
Cp. e.g. Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past. The Politics of Amnesty and 
tegration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002; original German version Munich: C. H. 
ck, 1996). See also Robert G. Moeller, War Stories. The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal 
public of Germany (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). 
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14 
racle” of the 1950s and 1960s had brought. While anti-colonialist theoreticians like 
e Guevara, Frantz Fanon and Carlos Marighella legitimized the use of counter-
olence against the state, they also provided an ideological basis for a new 
umanistic ethos” which – for Elias, “one of the most moving experiences of [these] 
es” – allowed these young Germans to identify themselves with “the struggle 
ainst injustice, oppression, exploitation of people throughout the world”.32  
at Elias took a generation perspective in his analysis of the events of the German 
tumn is not surprising. Firstly, his essay is the logical extension of his posthumous 
st book, The Germans, in which he applied his socio-genetic and psycho-genetic 
 of the civilising process to the development of national identity in nineteenth 
d twentieth-century Germany. Secondly, in focusing on power struggles between 
litical generations, Elias followed in the footsteps of Karl Mannheim whose 
sistant he had been before being deprived of an academic career in Germany in 
33. In the 1920s, Mannheim himself had developed the first elaborate historical 
eory of generations, when, since the turn of the twentieth century, organized youth 
erged as an important factor in German politics and society.33 Last but not least, 
erman history offers itself quite naturally to interpretations of this sort, since, as 
k Roseman put it, there is a “striking persistence of youthful rebellion in 
rmany”. The most obvious rationale for the frequent outbreak of open stilities 
tween political generations of Germans from the young writers of the Sturm und 
rang of the 1780s to the terrorists of the 1970s is that “few other nations have 
perienced such a succession of dramatic breaks in their historical narrative”.34 
ese ruptures in turn guaranteed a high degree of social mobility between 
nerations.  
 
32 Ibid. p. 417. 
33 Cp. Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations.” In Kurt H. Wolf ed., From Karl Mannheim 
(New Brunswick: Transaction, 1993), pp. 351-98; originally published as “Das Problem der 
Generationen.” Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie 7 (1928), pp. 157-80 and 309-50. 
34 Mark Roseman, “Introduction: generation conflict and German history 1770-1968.” In idem ed., 
Ge rations in Conflict. Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770-1968 (Cambridge: 
Ca y Press, 1995), pp. 1-24, here pp. 1-2. 
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r historians of modern Germany, it must arguably follow that in terms of analysis 
ion” is of similar relevance as “class” or “status”. The importance of 
eneration” as an analytical category has been widely recognized by historical 
holarship on “1968” both as an international and a German phenomenon. Eric 
obsbawm, for example, stresses the generational aspect of the youth revolt and 
edits it with achieving a “cultural revolution”, which necessarily followed from the 
cial revolution, which the “golden age” of economic development had brought 
out.35 Along similar lines, Geoff Eley recently claimed that the rebelliousness of 
dical youth in Germany and elsewhere “had antipatriarchal qualities – against the 
 of fathers in families but also against long-established political authority, 
bodied in the governing gerontocracy”.36 And, while also emphasising 
tergenerational conflict, Heinz Bude has focused on six German life histories in 
order to elucidate the different ways in which those born between 1938 and 1948 in 
tri
19
U
W  recent surveys of the history of the Federal Republic by German 
hi “1968” is “particularly prone to being overloaded with 
meaning, if not myth-making”.38 Most authors follow the verdicts of Jürgen 
H
de
im
fo
   
ed to extricate themselves from what they saw as the conservative restoration of the 
50s.37  
nanswered questions 
hen reading
storians, one recognizes that 
abermas and Richard von Weizsäcker, both of whom assigned the breakthrough of a 
mocratic society and the liberalisation of West Germany’s political culture to the 
pact of the youth revolt.39 Manfred Görtemaker, for example, speaks of a “re-
undation” (Umgründung) of the republic as a result of “1968”, while for Heinrich 
                                              
Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Michael 
eph, 1994), pp. 320-43. 
Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy. The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000 (Oxford, New York: 
35 
Jos
36 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 354. 
37 Cp. Heinz Bude, Das Altern einer Generation. Die Jahrgänge 1938-1948 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
19
38 rch of a Cause.” In idem ed., The Miracle Years. A Cultural History 
of 
p. 46
39 Cp. durch die Institutionen hat auch die CDU erreicht.” 
Fr
95).  
Hanna Schissler, “Rebels in Sea
West Germany, 1949-1968 (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 459-67, here 
0. 
ibid. and Jürgen Habermas, “Der Marsch 
ankfurter Rundschau, 11.3.1988. 
Comment [KS3]:  Fehler: 
delete 
  
 
Augu
We
of h
w
ci
H ite interestingly, the already-mentioned paradoxes, which were 
ch
w
is 
the 
lo
se
co
an
In
16 
st Winkler the events of the late 1960s aided in Germany’s “long path to the 
st”.40 Thus, according to what has become mainstream opinion among historians 
 twentiet -century Germany, without “1968”, the present-day Federal Republic 
ould not be able to call itself a liberal democracy and pride itself to have a modern 
vil society.  
owever, qu
aracteristic for the clash between political generations in “1968” and particularly in 
hat followed during the “red decade” until 1977 are barely touched upon. Reference 
scarcely made to the contradiction that the conflict between the militant Left and 
state played itself out during the years when two SPD chancellors embarked on a 
ng-overdue reform of the West German state and society. And – to repeat the 
cond exemplary contradiction – that the liberalisation and modernisation of the 
untry was supposedly largely due to a protest generation whose own outlook was 
ti-liberal, anti-parliamentary and anti-western.  
 order to shed further light on these paradoxes from the perspective of generation 
co  violence reigned during nflict, one can look at a set of questions. Why was it that
th
kid
six
H
D
w
G
D
vo
   
e “German autumn” of 1977? Why was it that the occasional bombings, 
nappings and murders of – to borrow the phrase from the novelist Heinrich Böll – 
 provoked such a hysterical reaction by the sixty million? Why was it that when 
anns-Martin Schleyer, president of the German Employers Federation (Bund 
eutscher Arbeitgeber, BDA) and head of the board of directors of Daimler Benz, 
as abducted by the RAF in order to free its leadership, at least half of all West 
ermans – and that must have included large sections of the electorate of the Social 
emocrats – were in favour of reintroducing the death penalty?41 While the often 
iced suggestion that, as a reprisal measure, the government should make short work 
                                              
Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von der Gründung bis zur 
genwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1999) and Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, 
l. ii, Deutsche Geschichte vom ‘Dritten Reich’ bis zur Wiedervereinigung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
40 
Ge
vo
2000). Cp. also Wolfgang Kraushaar, 1968 als Mythos, Chiffre und Zäsur (Hamburg: Hamburger 
Edition, 2000), p. 46. Kraushaar refers to the years from 1967 to 1969 as the key-period for the Federal 
Republic’s “belated socio-cultural foundation” (Nachgründung). 
41 
Uni
Richard Evans, Rituals of Retribution. Capital Punishment in Germany, 1600-1987 (Oxford: Oxford 
versity Press, 1996), statistical appendix, tables 14 and 15. 
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citizens’ private and public lives. The internal secret service alone gathered some two 
   
the RAF inmates in the high-security prison in Stuttgart-Stammheim easily found 
ay into the mass media of the time, information on Schleyer’s career as a member 
 the SS and a staff officer in Reinhard Heydrich’s economic administration of 
cupied Czechoslovakia was conspicuously absent.42  
hy did the Schmidt government abandon Brandt’s optimistic 19
otest movements to “dare more democracy” and react so heavy-handedly to the 
reat posed by a minority at the margins of political life? This was a government that 
esumably had accepted the main criticisms of “1968” and aimed at modernising 
erman society after decades of conservative rule. And it did so quite successfully. If 
 look at the reform legislation concerning social security and pensions (1970, 
72), co-determination in enterprises (1976), abortion law (reform of section 218 of 
e German penal code in 1976), marriage and family law (1976) and education, 
cluding higher education, West Germany indeed became a more liberal and modern 
ciety.  
t the same time, by evoking the memory of the self-induced collapse of the Weimar 
public, the
oups with the concept of “belligerent democracy” (wehrhafte Demokratie). It 
uced authoritarian legislation ranging from the Decree on Radicals 
ikalenerlaß) – the “Ban on Careers” in the parlance of the extra-parliamentary 
ft – which excluded communists from civil service jobs since 1972, to the infamous 
77 Lex Baader-Meinhof (Kontaktsperregesetz). The latter, rushed through the 
ndestag in a matter of days, among other measures limited the access of lawyers to 
eir defendants during the Schleyer abduction and at the time led Otto Schily, the 
rrent German home secretary, to resign his brief in protest.  
ken as a whole, the measures of the policy of inner security of the 1970s raised the 
ectre of West Germany becoming a surveillance state where police and the internal 
cret service were allowed to inspect and supervise nearly every aspect o
                                              
Ein deutscher Herbst. Zustände 1977 (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik, 1997), p. 134 and Elias, The 
rmans, p. 430. 
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llion files on suspected inner enemies.  In Horst Herold “a modernizer and 
rity intellectual” was appointed head of a greatly strengthened and expanded 
deral Office of Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA).44 His ambition 
ent “far beyond mere oppression [of crime] and extended to the preventative 
anning of a cybernetically steered society”.45 Accordingly, BKA officials secretly 
pped telephone lines and checked up on vast numbers of unsuspecting citizens.  
 course, one can explain much of what guided the “policy of inner security” by 
inting to the experience of Weimar and the fact that the West German state was by 
 means a monolithic block in the 1970s. While the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn 
ially wanted to avoid further confrontation and reintegrate the “1968ers” by, for 
stance, granting a comprehensive amnesty for violations of the demonstration laws 
 1970, the SPD in particular was concerned about how its own youth wing, the 
oung Socialists (Jungsozialisten, Jusos), attempted to re-ideologize the party in their 
n version of the long march through the institutions.46 At the same time, the 
U/CSU opposition, which for much of that decade could delay legislation in the 
deral Council, was keen on discrediting Ostpolitik, détente and reconciliation with 
stern Europe, by claiming that the government was “soft on communism abroad and 
remists’ at home”.47 The SPD in government felt certainly vulnerable on this 
t, since despite the party’s firm integration into the social and political system of 
e Federal Republic after Godesberg, it had only in 1969 become the largest party in 
e Bundestag and still felt the need to prove its reliability. Add to this the Munich 
lympics massacre in 1972, for which the authorities had been completely 
prepared, the murder of a federal judge by the RAF in 1974 and the successful 
renz kidnapping – to name just the most prominent incidents of terrorism during 
                                              
erhard Braunthal, Political Loyalty and Public Service in West Germany: The 1972 Decree against 
dicals and its Consequences (Amherst, Mass.: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1990), p. 166. 
43 G
Ra
44 A. D. Moses, “The State and the Student Movement in West Germany, 1967-77.” In Gerard J. 
DeGroot ed., Student Protest. The Sixties and After (Harlow: Longman, 1998), pp. 139-49, here p. 146.  
45 Quoted in Burns/van der Will, 62. Cp. also Dorothea Hauser, Baader und Herold. Beschreibung 
ein
46 
47 
es Kampfes (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998), especially pp. 179-86. 
Markovits/Gorski, pp. 94-5. 
Moses, p. 145. 
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ncellorship of the former army officer Schmidt – and the turn towards the 
g state becomes understandable. 
thorities and of society at large, one is nevertheless struck by the extent of 
pression and surveillance, which those in power felt was necessary in response to 
e challenge of the militant Left. As Markovits and Gorski put it: “Above all, the 
te’s measures seemed inappropriate, due to the fact that any kind of left-wing 
tremism, let alone of the terrorist sort, enjoyed absolutely no support among the 
pulation as a whole.”48 
hy however – to continue with
d secretly murdered the Stammheim inmates of the RAF in their cells? That 
spicion was first voiced when Ulrike Meinhof, arrested with the other leaders of the 
F as early as June 1972, could not bear life in prison any longer and hanged herself 
 May 1976. The discovery of the dead bodies of Baader, Gudrun Ensslin and Jan-
rl Raspe in their cells a year-and-a-half later on 18 October 1977 seemed to 
nfirm it. To be sure, the leaders of the RAF in all likelihood took their own lives 
se they saw no other alternative. After the liberation of another Lufthansa 
eing by German special forces in Mogadishu in Somalia the day before – this time 
jacked by a PLO commando during the Schleyer abduction to put additional 
essure on the state to release its political prisoners – this seemed to be the last 
ssible alternative to serving their life sentences. Moreover, collective suicide 
aranteed them the status of martyrs, since many left of the political centre believed 
at the state had resorted to Gestapo methods in dealing with its political 
versaries.49 
ow then was it possible that the conflict between the state and the militant Left had 
adually escalated, until all channels of communication had completely broken down 
 
48 
49 
Zi
Kritik, 1997), pp. 156-69, here p. 169. 
Markovits/Gorski, p. 77. 
Wolfgang Kraushaar, “Die Schleyer-Entführung: 44 Tage ohne Opposition. Die Linke im 
rkelschluß von RAF und Staat.” In Ein deutscher Herbst. Zustände 1977 (Frankfurt: Verlag Neue 
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d those involved on both sides were either overwhelmed by fear or consumed by 
ent fantasies of punishment and destruction? Of course, on the surface this was the 
sult of an accelerating spiral of tit for tat, violence and counter-violence. However, 
 a deeper level, the answer for this question has indeed to be sought in the clash 
tween different political generations and in their respective attitudes towards the 
azi past. Both the West German electorate and the élites of the state, which felt it 
cessary to resort to exaggerated repressive measures in order to protect the 
nstitution, and those who wanted to bring down liberal democracy were encased in 
e experience of the Third Reich. For both sides it was a historical memory, which 
heir political actions in the present. While many of the exponents of the 
rman political system had made their formative experiences during the 1930s, 
terrorism itself was the by-product of a ‘self-righteous’ rebellion against fascism.50 In 
th
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as dt put it, is incapable of speech. It was this silence, this absence of 
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Fr cember 1977, Tiedemann had been arrested and given a 
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is sense, engaging in political violence against the Federal Republic simply meant 
rrying the “accusing anger of children against the guilty silence of parents”51 to its 
tremes.  
t the apex of this confrontation, there was only fear and violence, violence, which, 
 Hannah Aren
mmunication, which Gaby Tiedemann and Heinrich Albertz briefly overcame 
ring their flight from Frankfurt to Aden on 3 March 1975. That they were able to 
ablish a meaningful dialogue, if only for a short time, allowed them to develop 
eir acquaintance into a lasting friendship more than a decade later. 
edemann on trial 
ril 1987 Albertz got in touch again with Tiedemann by writing to her in priso
indelbank near Bern in Switzerland. After a shoot-out with border-guards at the 
anco-Swiss border in De
rther fifteen years for attempted murder by a Swiss court. The occasion for Albertz’ 
fter having served the obligatory two thirds of her sentence, five years 
                                              
Michael Geyer/Miriam Hansen, “German-Jewish Memory and National Consciousness.” In Geoffrey 
 Hartman ed., Holocaust Remembrance. The Shapes of Memory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 175-
, here p. 176. 
50 
H.
90
51 Eley, p. 418. 
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she spent in complete isolation, Tiedemann was about to be extradited to sit 
t the remainder of her previous German conviction. At the beginning of 1988 she 
as returned to Germany. 
s letter, Albertz pointed out that 
d particularly because of their encounter he had learned a lot about mankind and 
w we should treat one another”.52 In her reply, Tiedemann wrote that Albertz stood 
r “something strange and out of place” during those days in 1975. In her 
terpretation he “quite possibly represented her own inner voice which she had to 
ppress at the time”.53 From this renewal of their acquaintance ensued a closer 
ntact, through prison visits by Albertz and a regular correspondence between the 
o.  
 the o
 by
ember of the Confessing Church, he himself had spent a considerable amount of 
e in prison after a 1943 sermon in support of Martin Niemöller.54 Tiedemann was 
rn to middle-class parents in the GDR in 1951. Both of her parents were 
hoolteachers. When she was six years old, her father, in her own words, an 
olic and during the war “a convinced Nazi”, was given a prison sentence for 
reading right-wing propaganda under the influence of drink. A few years later he 
as released and deported to West Germany, to where his family followed him. After 
r parents’ divorce in 1969, Tiedemann lost all contact to her father. She joined the 
est Berlin political underground in the summer of 1972.55  
 her letters to Albertz, Tiedemann reflected both on her past and her current 
uation. Before his first visit in August 1988, she pointed out that she had turned her 
ck on the “armed struggle” as early as 1980. Nevertheless, the authori
                                              
Heinrich Albertz to Gaby Tiedemann, 1 April 1987, Archive Gabriele B.H.F. (Gaby) Tiedemann 
51-1995), 1975-1995, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, Box 8, Folder 3.  
52 
(19
53 Tiedemann to Albertz, 28 May 1987, ibid. 
54 Cp. Munzinger Archiv 32/93. 
55 Kantonspolizei Bern, Protocol of the interrogation of Gaby Tiedemann, 4 January 1978, Archive 
Tiedemann, Box 11, Folder 2. 
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ed her as a security risk of the first order. She felt that in view of this, words like 
reintegration into society sounded as if they were meant to heap 
orn on her. All she could see was “endless revenge and retaliation”.56 
t worse was to come for her. In November 1989 Tiedemann was again put on t a
 Cologne, this time for a double murder. Like Hans-Joachim Klein in 1999, she was 
cused of having participated in the 1975 raid on the OPEC headquarter in Vienna. 
uring the attack, in which eleven oil ministers of OPEC states were held hostage for 
enty hours before being eventually flown to Algeria with the kidnappers, two of the 
sualties, an Austrian police officer and an Iraqi bodyguard, were supposedly shot 
ecution-style by the only female member of the group, known only by her cover 
me “Nada”. In the aftermath it was widely assumed that Nada was Gaby 
edemann.57 As opposed to Klein, who, injured by a stray-bullet during the attack, 
d to be treated in a Viennese hospital and could be positively identified, 
edemann’s identity could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt even at the time, 
cause the Austrian authorities had bungled their investigation.58 Fourteen years later 
it was even less possible to prove her involvement and that was her salvation. On 22 
May 1990 she was acquitted by the Cologne Landgericht.  
Th
co 89 to early 
summer 1990 German public life was primarily occupied with the collapse of 
co
co
   
e trial makes for interesting reading, as it took place under circumstances 
mpletely different from those of the “red decade”. From the end of 19
mmunism and preparations for reunification. Accordingly, the proceedings were 
nducted in an extraordinarily sober and unspectacular manner and did not attract 
                                              
Tiedemann to Albertz, 28 July 1988, Nachlaß Heinrich Albertz, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der 56 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Folder 123. 
57 Cp. e.g. [Österreichisches] Bundeskanzleramt ed., Die Vorfälle vom 21. und 22. Dezember 1975 
(Überfall auf die Teilnehmer der OPEC-Konferenz). Ein Dokumentarbericht (Vienna: 
Bundeskanzleramt, 1976), pp. 51 and 60. According to Klein’s “memoirs” Rückkehr in die 
Menschlichkeit (Reinbek: Rowohlt,1986) as well, Gaby Tiedemann was Nada. 
58 
w ould not have stood up in court because of the 
wa
au
w
For instance, although the group of five men and one woman did not wear gloves, no fingerprints 
ere ever taken. Moreover, the witness testimonies w
y questioning had been conducted. This has led to speculation about a cover-up by the Austrian 
thorities for fear of future terrorist reprisals. It is widely believed that Libya, itself an OPEC country, 
as behind the Vienna events of December 1975. 
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e crowds.  Testimony to the changed political climate was also that while 
demann was put on trial for murder, the prosecution had refrained from accusing 
r of section 129a of the German penal code, i.e. formation of a terrorist 
ganisation. 
t the same time, 
r appearance beyond recognition and gained a vocational degree while in prison, 
but she was also quick to condemn the murder of Alfred Herrnhausen by the RAF on 
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 November 1989 in a statement to the court. She called the killing of the head of 
eutsche Bank “indicative for the RAF’s complete loss of a sense of reality”.60  
st but not least, Tiedemann had public figures like the Green Party MP Antje 
r.61 Having become a surrogate father to her, Albertz supported her materially, by 
ntributing to the cost of her defence, as well as in his writings. In a 1989 diary he 
rote the following entry on occasion of the trial:  
Whatever she may have done in Vienna, she has been sufficiently punished by 
fourteen years in prison, […], for a long time [she has been] di
views of terrorist criminals, [she is] a human being who
esh. […] Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus. No, this is not how the world perishes. 
t a human being perishes. Another human being in the endless chain of 
lence and counter-violence.62 
 1991, after altogether sixteen years in prison, Tiedemann was eventually 
d. From what we know, she and Albertz developed their relationship into a 
nd lasting friendship.63 When Albertz 
eakers at the memorial service in his former Berlin parish. Tiedemann reminded 
ose present of how his humour, paternal attitude and his ability to listen had eased 
 
Eva Tasche, “Ist sie’s oder ist sie’s nicht?” Deutsche Presse Agentur, 11.1.1990. 
id. 
59 
60 Ib
61 Cp. e.g. Giovanni di Lorenzo, “Gibt es ein Leben nach dem Terrorismus? Nach insgesamt 14 Jahren 
Haft steht Gabriele Tiedemann wieder vor Gericht.” Süddeutsche Zeitung Wochenendbeilage, 19 & 20 
May 1990. 
62 . 78-
9. 
63 Al  dürfen nicht schweigen, pp. 78-9. 
Heinrich Albertz, Am Ende des Weges. Nachdenken über das Alter (Munich: Kindler, 1989), pp
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sions aboard the Lufthansa Boeing on its way from Frankfurt to Aden.  She 
 not have much time to enjoy her regained freedom. In October 1995, only four-
d-a-half years after her release, she died from cancer at age forty-four.  
nclusion 
ow, what is one
entioned at different points in this paper have not been completely unravelled. They 
ere however illustrated and given sharper contours. This way it should have become 
earer how the modernisation of West German society by SPD-led governments 
uld go hand in hand with political repression of those who were deemed to be 
emies of democracy. Furthermore, by pointing to generation conflict, a crucial 
mponent for developing a historical understanding of the escalation of violence 
tween militant Left and West German state and society has been emphasized.  
owever, as far as the role of the “1968ers” in the socio-cultural transformation of the 
untry is concerned, it is much too early to come to any valid conclusions. Much 
ore historical research on this period is needed. As Wolfgang Kraushaar put it: 
urtains closed and all archives open – at least most of them.”65 
nally, is there a deeper meaning to the story of Gaby Tiedemann and Heinrich 
lbertz beyond the fact that he assumed the role of a surrogate father for her?
ritten in 1919, in times of significantly greater political turmoil: 
The man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the 
souls of others does not seek these aims along the path of politics. Politics has 
quite different goals which can only be achieved by force.66 
 
64 Schuster, Heinrich Albertz, pp. 295-6. 
65 Kraushaar, 1968, p. 347. 
66 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation.” In W. G. Runciman ed., Weber. Selections in Translation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 212-25, here p. 223. 
